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Abstract
Grice’s maxims of conversation [Grice 1975] are framed
as directives to be followed by a speaker of the lan-
guage. This paper argues that, when considered from
the point of view of natural language generation, such a
characterisation is rather misleading, and that the de-
sired behaviour falls out quite naturally if we view lan-
guage generation as a goal-oriented process. We argue
this position with particular regard to the generation
of referring expressions.
Introduction
The position taken in this paper can be summarised as
follows.
1. Grice’s maxims [Grice 1975] are framed as directives
to the speaker, and so it is natural to consider how
they might impact on the task of natural language
generation (nlg).
2. A number of the maxims can collectively be expressed
by the imperative “Don’t say too much and don’t
say too little.” This focusses our attention on the
language generation subtask of content determi-
nation; and one of the more constrained and well-
explored aspects of content determination is the gen-
eration of referring expressions. However, if we look
at this task in detail, it becomes clear that there are
problems with enforcing a literal interpretation of the
maxims.
3. We review some of our previous work that has tried
to address this problem, but go on to suggest a rather
more radical position: that Grice’s maxims are un-
necessary directives from the point of view of refer-
ring expression generation, and that, provided the
register and sublanguage conventions of the genre in
force are conformed to, the behaviour the maxims
characterise actually falls out quite naturally from
viewing nlg as a goal-oriented process.
Under this view, the maxims are no more than post hoc
characterisations of the way language works, and their
framing as directives is ultimately rather misleading.
Copyright c© 2018, American Association for Artificial In-
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Adequate and Efficient Referring
Expressions
Grice and Reference: Deciding What To
Say
It has become commonplace to view language genera-
tion as encompassing two kinds of concerns: deciding
what to say, and deciding how to say it.1 The con-
siderations that arise in deciding what to say are often
expressed in terms that echo Grice’s Maxims of Quan-
tity: don’t say too much, and don’t say too little. There
are many reasons why such imperatives are worth at-
tending to in the development of algorithms to be used
by computational systems which generate natural lan-
guage; for example, we want to make sure that we have
given the hearer the information that she needs, but
we don’t want to bore her with a flood of unnecessary
statements. From the point of view of implicatures,
however, an additional concern is that saying too much
might lead the hearer to read between the lines in ways
that were unintended by the underlying system. Ulti-
mately, language generation systems should be as ca-
pable of exploiting the notion of conversational impli-
cature as much as people do; but before we can achieve
goals of that kind, it’s important that we know when
we are obeying the maxims. In other words, our first
priority is to ensure that the generated text does not
unintentionally contain false implicatures.
The task of generating referring expressions—and
in particular, anaphoric referring expressions—provides
an arena where we can move towards a more formal
specification of what this really involves. Given some
internal symbol that corresponds to an intended refer-
ent, the job of a referring expression generator is to de-
termine the semantic content of a noun phrase that will
identify the intended referent to the hearer. The first
serious consideration of this issue in the nlg literature
was probably McDonald’s [1980] discussion of potential
distractors—other entities in the context we might mis-
takenly refer to—when deciding whether or not it was
safe to use a pronoun to refer to an entity. Appelt [1982]
1We take no particular stance in the present discussion
as to how this distinction impacts on the modularity of the
architecture of a language generation system.
and Novak [1988] looked at determining the content of
definite noun phrase referring expressions in situations
where (for whatever reason) a pronoun could not be
used. In Dale [1989], one of us characterised the task of
determining the content of a referring expression as be-
ing constrained by three Grice-like principles: the prin-
ciple of sensitivity, which states that the referring
expression chosen should take account of the state of
the hearer’s knowledge; the principle of adequacy,
which states that the referring expression chosen should
be sufficient to identify the intended referent; and the
principle of efficiency, which states that the re-
ferring expression chosen should provide no more infor-
mation than is necessary for the identification of the
intended referent.
An Algorithm for Saying The Right
Amount
Suggestions that referring expression generation should
be governed by principles like those just described are
common, but detailed algorithms that meet the speci-
fied goals are somewhat rarer. Dale [1989] proposed an
algorithm which assumes the following scenario:
Suppose that we have a set of entities C (called
the context set) such that C = {a1, a2, . . . , an};
and our task is to distinguish from this context
set some intended referent r where r ∈ C. Sup-
pose, also, that each entity ak is described in the
system’s knowledge base by means of a set of prop-
erties, pk1 , pk2 , . . . , pkm . In order to distinguish our
intended referent r from the other entities in C, we
need to find some set of properties which are to-
gether true of r, but of no other entity in C. The
linguistic realisation of this set of properties con-
stitutes a distinguishing description (dd) of r
with respect to the context C. A minimal dis-
tinguishing description is then the linguistic
realisation of the smallest such set of properties.
The detail of the algorithm is unimportant for present
purposes; basically, it consists of three steps as follows:
1. Check Success: see if the description we have con-
structed so far picks out only one entity in the con-
text. If it does, stop. If not, go to Step 2.
2. Choose Property: determine which property of the
intended referent would rule out the largest number
of other entities in the context. Go to Step 3.
3. Extend Description: add the chosen property to the
description being constructed, and remove the enti-
ties it rules out from the context. Go to Step 1 with
this extended description and the reduced context.
Reiter [1990] noted a serious deficiency of this algo-
rithm: it will not in fact always produce a minimal
distinguishing description, and indeed finding a mini-
mal distinguishing description is equivalent to solving a
minimal set-cover problem, which is np-hard. The com-
putational complexity of this task raises the question of
whether it is appropriate to insist on an algorithm that
creates minimal distinguishing descriptions. In other
words, it may be unreasonable to try to construct max-
imally adequate and efficient referring expressions; or,
more to the point, meeting Grice’s requirements of say-
ing neither too much nor too little, if taken literally,
may be computationally unachievable.
Cooperative Behaviour as an
Epiphenomenon
Allowing in Redundancy
One response to Reiter’s objection is to take the view
that the notion of minimality sought in the algorithm
above is too strong. In subsequent work we took a step
back and asked: what do people actually do when they
construct referring expressions? It is very difficult to
make any strong claims on the basis of the experiments
that have been done, but it does seem to be the case
that people do not build minimal distinguishing descrip-
tions in the strong sense suggested above. We explored
these considerations in more detail in [Dale and Reiter
1995], where we proposed a revised algorithm which is
computationally efficient at the cost of producing some
informational redundancy in the referring expressions
it generates.
Implicit vs Explicit Pursuance of the
Maxims
So: obeying the Gricean maxims looks computationally
problematic, and it seems not to be what people do
(with some caveats: we are assuming a literal interpre-
tation of the maxims, and assuming that it is possible
to generalise from the experimental results).
Our early attempts to generate referring expressions
(as presented, for example, in Dale [1989] and Re-
iter [1990]) explicitly enforced variants of the Gricean
Maxim of Quantity. However, our current hypothesis is
that this is in fact unnecessary. We now take the view
that it is a mistake to view the Gricean Maxims as di-
rectives; they are really no more than post hoc charac-
terisations of what is going on. They may even mislead
us in the construction of mechanisms that cooperate
conversationally.
It is generally accepted that language generation can
fruitfully be viewed as a goal-oriented process. In other
words, a natural language generation system may be
given as input an agenda of goals that are to be satis-
fied in the text being constructed; the system’s task is
to find linguistic devices that satisfy each goal, remov-
ing the goal from the agenda once it has been achieved.
There are a wide variety of goals that might appear in
such a mechanism. In the context of referring expres-
sion generation, typical goals could include:
• Getting the hearer to identify the intended referent
r.
• Alerting the hearer to the fact that r has the property
represented by the attribute value pair 〈a, v〉.
A goal of the form of the first of these will give rise to
the construction of a distinguishing description; a goal
of the form of the second of these might result in the
inclusion of information beyond that required for refer-
ent identification (Robin [1994] is a good discussion of
some of the issues that arise in developing algorithms
to achieve such goals). This information could be ex-
pressed in a separate clause, but could equally well be
folded into the same referring expression that is being
used for the referent identification in the first goal (Ap-
pelt [1982] provides a very nice example of this).
The fact that information can appear in a noun
phrase for purposes other than referent identification
means, of course, that the hearer has to do some work
in determining what the role of each provided descrip-
tor is. In the case of an utterance like Give me the red
pen, the speaker may be providing the term red in order
to distinguish the intended referent from another pen
which is green. It is equally possible, though, that there
is only one pen in the context, and red is included in the
description because colour has special salience (it may
be easier for the speaker to first look for red objects,
and then find the particular red object which is a pen).
Another possibility—perhaps a little tenuous in the cur-
rent example, but clearly a possibility nonetheless—is
that the hearer may be red–green colour blind, and the
speaker is imparting additional information about the
colour of the pen which the hearer may be able to make
use of later. A more common clue to descriptor pur-
pose is that fact that some properties are more likely to
be used for referent identification than others. In the
utterance Sit by the newly-painted table, for example,
the property newly-painted could be being used to dis-
tinguish the intended referent from other tables in the
context, but it is rather more likely that its purpose is
to warn the hearer not to put her elbows on the table.2
In addition to goal orientation, aspects of genre such
as register and sublanguage also play an important
role in determining appropriate referring expressions.
In particular, whether a specific referring expression is
interpreted by the hearer as being purely for identifi-
cation or not may depend on the current genre. For
example, in casual conversation, a hearer might inter-
pret Give me the Staedtler pen as having some purpose
beyond simple identification (perhaps informing the
hearer that the speaker prefers pens made by Staedtler),
since manufacturer is not a commonly used attribute in
identification-only referring expressions in this genre.
In an inventory-stocking context, on the other hand,
Give me the Staedtler pensmight be construed as purely
referential, since manufacturer is often used as an iden-
tifying attribute in this genre. Consequently, an nlg
system that is generating an identification-only refer-
ring expression should if possible use only those at-
tributes that are typically used for identification in the
target genre; otherwise, false implicatures may arise.
However, again we believe that there is no need to ex-
2This example is due to Bonnie Webber.
plicitly model this phenomenon as an implicature; it is
sufficient to design the system so that it uses the identi-
fying attributes preferred in its target genre (as is done
via the PreferredAttributes list in the algorithm
of [Dale and Reiter 1995]).
Although in the above examples the hearer may have
to perform some potentially complex inferencing to de-
termine what the speakers’ goals are, note that there
is no need for the speaker to do anything other than
satisfy the list of goals using resources appropriate to
the current genre. Nowhere is there an explicit attempt
to adhere to the maxims.
Reassessing the Maxims
In the light of the above discussion, we revisit Grice’s
maxims in this section and comment on how each might
be best interpreted in the context of natural language
generation.
The Maxim of Quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true. More
specifically:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
No natural language generation systems that we are
aware of deliberately say things that are false: this can
happen by accident, of course, but then it is not inten-
tional.
An arguable exception to this claim is the work of
Jameson [1987], whose Imp system injects bias into its
utterances in order to mislead; but even here this is not
done by telling lies. Certainly, in principle one could
construct a generation system that ‘lied’ for purposes
such as advertising or manipulation, or that produced
descriptions that were ‘correct’ relative to the hearer’s
knowledge even if they were untrue in the world; for
example, we might want to build a system which could
generate the man drinking a martini to refer to a man
who was actually drinking water from a martini glass.
This would require explicit programming, however; the
default behaviour of all systems we are aware of is to
automatically obey the Maxim of Quality.
The Maxim of Quantity
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative
than is required.
The first part of the Maxim of Quantity is automatically
fulfilled by a goal-oriented system: the goal will not be
satisfied until sufficient information is provided. What
we should say about the second part of the maxim, how-
ever, depends on how strongly or literally we choose to
interpret it. If we insist that referring expressions or
other utterances contain no unnecessary words, then we
will probably have to explicitly enforce this as a con-
straint in our nlg system; in general, nlg systems will
not automatically obey this rule. On the other hand, if
we interpret the second part of the Maxim of Quality
as meaning ‘do not go out of your way to add extra in-
formation that is not needed’, then this behaviour once
more comes for free with goal-orientation. Our experi-
ence suggests that, at least for the task of generating
referring expressions, the second interpretation is the
best one.
The Maxim of Relevance
Be relevant.
Yet again, this follows directly from goal-oriented be-
haviour: there is no reason why the system should con-
sider saying something that is not relevant. It is possi-
ble, of course, that an algorithm might unintentionally
include irrelevant information; this is also true of hu-
man linguistic behaviour.
The Maxim of Manner
Be perspicuous. More specifically:
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixy).
4. Be orderly.
These are places where an anticipation feedback mech-
anism of the kind proposed by Jameson and Wahlster
[1982] might be appropriate: i.e, we might like a system
to subject its proposed utterance to a self-monitoring
stage, to make sure that it is not ambiguous and so on.
Of all the maxims, it is perhaps these (with the excep-
tion of the brevity submaxim, to which our response is
the same as our response to the Maxim of Quantity)
which are most amenable to explicit modelling in the
generation process; but even here it is equally possible
that over time we learn heuristics that do the job for us,
so that the generation task more or less naturally pro-
duces results that have the required characteristics (see
Levelt’s [1989] comments on this as a possible charac-
teristic of the human language production mechanism).
Exploiting Violations
The goal-oriented approach has the additional benefit
that using violations of the maxims in order to get some
other point across falls out as part of the same mecha-
nism; again, see Jameson’s [1987] work in this regard.
From the point of view of the generator they are not
violations at all.
Conclusions
We have argued that Grice’s Maxims do not need to be
explicitly enforced or modelled in a natural language
generation system. Instead, they should be replaced by
the following system construction principles.
Grice and Generation
A generation system should be goal-driven, and con-
form to the current genre. As a general architecture,
this suggests a process which builds an agenda of goals,
and then searches for communicative and linguistics re-
sources in the target genre which can be used to realize
these goals. There is the possibility that such a sys-
tem may end up saying something beyond what was
intended. That is acceptable. Minimality is not neces-
sary; provided the information that is provided is there
because it serves some purpose, hearers will not make
inappropriate inferences.
Grice and Interpretation
As a corollary to the goal-oriented view of generation,
the hearer should assume that every informational ele-
ment in the speaker’s utterance is there with some in-
tended purpose. The hearer’s job is then to work out
what the speaker’s intended purpose is. If we are in
a context, for example, where referent identification is
obviously the task, and the expression contains infor-
mation unnecessary for identification, the hearer must
consider the possibility that this information has been
provided by the speaker for some other purpose—but
note that it might not be; it might have been put in
to help with identification even if it turns out that the
hearer did not make use of it for that purpose.3 Prop-
erties which are clearly not able to help us in identi-
fying the intended referent must be doing something
else. In the context of our newly-painted table example,
it many cases it will be impossible to determine that
something is newly-painted simply by looking; and it is
unlikely that the speaker intends us to go around ac-
tually touching all the tables to identify which one has
that property; so it is reasonable to assume that the
property has been provided for some other purpose.
In Summary
Ultimately, for the generator, Grice’s maxims taken col-
lectively mean Don’t include elements that don’t do any-
thing. Our position is that, under a goal-oriented view
of language generation, there is no need to explicitly
follow such a directive at all; the desired behaviour just
falls out of the mechanism. We have argued, in the
present paper, that this is true of the referring expres-
sion generation task; it remains to be seen whether the
same story can be told of all language generation, and
what the impact of this is on models of language un-
derstanding.
3Returning to our earlier red pen example, suppose the
hearer just happens to be focussed on the red pen when
the utterance is produced. Then, the property of redness
may have been included by the speaker in order to help the
hearer identify the intended referent even if it is not used
for this purpose.
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